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REDRESS, PROGRESS AND THE 
BENCHMARK PROBLEM 
AVIAM SOIFER* 
The Federal Constitution clearly guarantees the right "to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances."1 Yet, judicial decisions 
construing this guarantee are strikingly rare and there is little doctrinal 
or scholarly exploration of what, if anything, such a right ought to 
entail,2 To be sure, virtually any legal claim premised on denial of the 
right to petition for redress of grievances seems merely to overlap with 
more familiar, "cognate" First Amendment rights such as freedom 
of expression and assembly.3 Moreover, the citizenry in the United 
States have been comparatively free to seek redress throughout most 
of our history.4 And the constitutional guarantee is phrased in terms 
of seeking redress; it certainly does not seem to guarantee actually 
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I ,wuld like to dedicate this essay to the 
wonderful BCLS students whose thinking and hard work produced the great success of the Fifth 
Annual Conference of Asian Pacific American Law Faculty and this important Symposium. I am 
also particularly grateful to Professor Fred Yen for all he did, to my exceptional research assistant, 
George Linge, and to the authors of the three first-rate articles that provoked these comments. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. 1. 
2 For a fine recent exception, see Gregory A. Mark, The Festigial Constitution: The HistOJ), 
and Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. RE\". 2153 (1998). 
3 In Brown 11. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141 (1966), for example, in the course of invalidating 
a conviction for a silent protest against the segregation ofa public library, Justice Fortas's plurality 
opinion described "an aspect of a basic constitutional right-the right [of] speech and of 
assembly, and freedom to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." He went on to 
assert that these rights "are not confined to verbal expression." /d. at 142. The right to petition 
for redress of grievances figured more prominently later the same year injustice Douglas's dissent 
in Adderley 11. FlO1ida, 385 U.S. 39, 49 (1966) (Douglas,]., dissenting). Douglas, joined by Chief 
Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Fortas, objected to the majority's decision to uphold 
the convictions of 32 college students for protesting outside a local Florida jail where their 
colleagues were incarcerated for demonstrating against racial segregation. See id. Quoting the 
Magna Carta, Douglas described a right with "an ancient history," essential for those without 
funds or clout enough to use more regular channels to reach gm"ernment officials, and not to 
be trumped by a peaceful trespass on public property. See id.: see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 
516, 529-30 (1945) (desc'ribing "cognate rights" of freedom of speech, press, peaceable assembly 
and petition for redress of grie"ances as "inseparable"): Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 30i 
U.S. 496, 512-13 (1939) (Roberts,]., concurring, with "'hom Black,]., joined and "ith whom 
Hughes, CJ., concurred in part) (identifying national prh'ileges and immunities of citizenship 
with right to petition Congress for redress of grie,·ances). 
4 The most famous exception was the Gag Rule in the 1830s and early 1840s, with which 
Congress simply refused to accept antislavery petitions. See generally 1 WILLIAM \\'. FREEHLING, 
THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS AT BAY, lii6-1854, at 289-352 (1990). 
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obtaining redress. In our highly legalistic culture, however, it is appro-
priately difficult to ignore the basic claim that clear legal wrongs ought 
to have remedies.5 
The excellent articles presented by Professors Chris lijima, Robert 
Westley and Eric Yamamoto offer eloquent analyses of the pluses and 
minuses within diverse claims for reparations. They make thoughtful 
and hardheaded suggestions regarding various possible audiences for 
such claims. All three authors underscore the huge importance of re-
membering official sins of the past, yet they also suggest the difficulty in 
convincing anyone to do anything toward beginning to make amends. 
Beyond the obvious political difficulties and the need to overcome the 
remarkable ahistoricism of most Americans, those who seek redress 
must confront the fundamental presentist supposition that dominates 
our nation. The prevailing presumption is that somehow, sometime-
perhaps when we weren't paying attention-sufficient justice and 
equality came to prevail. Therefore, it is assumed, we all now enjoy an 
equal, fair start in the cosmic race of life. We hold tightly to this credo 
as if it were self-evident, no matter what the actual evidence may be. 
At the end of this often-horrific century, to define reality with this 
baseless leap offaith seems particularly parochial, though this very leap 
dominates contemporary discourse in the United States. 
Throughout the world today, however, people are seeking to for-
mulate mechanisms to deal with the vast array of collective horrors of 
the recent past. As Martha Minow illuminates with great insight, bal-
ance and compassion in her latest book, nations and individuals are 
currently probing for new paths between vengeance and forgiveness. 6 
By such means as war crimes tribunals, truth and reconciliation com-
missions, reparations and an array of innovative living memorials, 
there is a fundamental quest to right wrongs despite the clear under-
standing, shared by many, that the lasting impact of mass violence and 
collective persecution can never be truly remedied. It is also significant 
and fitting that these efforts proceed despite the lack of some clear-cut 
benchmark established in the past. This benchmark problem is an 
issue in the United States as well, but it is not, I maintain, an insur-
mountable obstacle. 
5 "The ,-ery essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim 
the protection of the laws, whene\'er he receives an injury .... [The) government of the United 
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease 
to deser\'e this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the ~iolation of a vested legal 
right." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
6 See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER 
GENOCIDE AND MASS ViOLENCE (1998). 
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A. No Baseline, No Nunc Pro Tunc 
The basic problem: Now is now, then was then, and now and then 
won't do. There can be no convincing nunc pro tunc ("now for then," 
a commonplace common law fiction), no persuasive legal fiction able 
to "roll back the tide of time."7 To right past wrongs and to make 
victims, or the descendants of victims, whole again is deeply problem-
atic for many reasons. Not the least of these is the impossibility of defin-
ing a baseline and holding to it, as if it were flash frozen, throughout 
subsequent changes. We are aware that the world is full of contingen-
cies, and we cannot ignore multi\'ariable causation that is the compli-
cated stuff of good fiction, great history and chaos theory. Remem-
brance may be the essential key to redemption,!'! but redemption does 
not necessarily-nor even probably-entail going back. 
It is painfully true that, at least in this life, "You Can't Go Home 
Again."9 Even happy endings in classic myths and fairy tales do not 
deny this harsh truth. By the time Odysseus reaches Ithaca, for exam-
ple, his hunting dogs do not recognize him. Along with Penelope and 
Telemachus, Odysseus and Ithaca can never be fully restored. They 
may be better for the transformation, but their old standard cannot 
hold. And in The Wizard of Oz, Dorothy might learn that there is no 
place like home, but perceptive members of the audience know that 
somehow both Dorothy and Kansas have changed forever. 
'Hall v. United States, 92 U.S. 27, 30 (1875). In Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 
U.S. 826, 840 (1989) (Kennedy, j., dissenting), for example, Justice Kennedy, joined in dissent 
by Justice Scalia, observed, "[t]he charming utility of the nunc pro tunc de\'ice cannot obscure 
its outright fiction." The dissenters objected to the majority's willingness to allow federal appellate 
courts to use Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss dispensable non-diverse 
parties in order, retroactively, to assure proper diversity jurisdiction. See id. at 839. In Hall, the 
unanimous Court defined its duty to be to "roll back the tide of time, and to imagine" one's self 
back in Mississippi before abolition. 92 U.S. at 30. Having performed this feat of mental gymnas-
tics, the Justices found it easy to deny a claim by a former slave to a share of cotton from the 
plantation on which he toiled, because everyone knew that slaves could not contract or own 
property in Mississippi before abolition. See id. at 31. 
8 This statement by the Ba'al Shem Tov is on the wall ofYad Vashem, the Holocaust memorial 
in Jerusalem. For a fine modern biography, see MOSHE ROSMAN, FOUNDER OF HASIDISM: A QUEST 
FOR THE HISTORICAL BA'AL SHEM To\' (1996). 
9 THOMAS WOLFE, You CAN'T Go HOME AGAIN (1940). Perhaps the fact that Wolfe was two 
years dead when his much-pared-down novel was published underscores the point. The Supreme 
Court clearly has had difficulty recently in sorting out retrospecth'e and prospecth'e relief in the 
context of federal courts and the Eleventh Amendment, for example. See, e.g., Idaho v. Couer 
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996); Carlos Vazquez, Night and Day: Coeur d'Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling of the Prospec-
tive-Retrospective Distinction in Elellenth Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. LJ. 1 (1998). 
528 40 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 525 [Symposium 
Provoked in the best sense by all three of these examples of 
first-rate legal scholarship, I will use this brief comment to focus on 
basic conceptual challenges that lurk within any effort to obtain legal 
or political redress for massive past depredations. Notwithstanding 
Justice Holmes's words,1O I agree with these three authors that activists 
and government officials, advocates and judges all ought to pursue 
justice for past wrongs despite the full knowledge that justice can never 
be achieved fully. The same message may be even more important for 
everyone else. After all, redress almost surely must have grass-roots 
support to take hold effectively. 
My argument is twofold. First, I claim that we should give special 
attention to the broad, open-ended promises of the past. We ought to 
do this not because those promises are specifically binding, but rather 
with acceptance of such promises as visionary-and even as changeable 
over time. Great past promises are thus to be understood partially as 
hortatory, yet also partly as binding upon the future. Second, and 
perhaps still more controversially, I maintain that there is some hope 
for progress after all. To realize that hope, it may be necessary to 
stretch analysis beyond the kind of equity familiar to lawyers and 
philosophers. 
By expanding the boundaries of traditional analysis, we begin to 
move through the usual confines of legal justice to more contextual 
righteousness. Paradoxically, the very absence of a clear baseline ren-
ders use of the normative imagination more frightening and, perhaps, 
more accessible than most legal discourse. Enforcing old visionary 
words may appeal to people in venues far removed from the marble 
courtrooms that exist, at least in our imaginations, to dispense equal 
justice under law. This approach may help redeem key elements of the 
promise of America. 
B. "A promissory note to which every American was to fall heir"ll 
In the course of his soaring "I Have a Dream" speech at the March 
on Washington in August of 1963, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. declared 
"the fierce urgency of now. "12 The trope that King used to illustrate this 
10 Holmes delighted in denying that justice had anything to do with the work of the Justices, 
and he said so often. I quoted and discussed several characteristically pithy Holmesian examples, 
and some of the scholarly discussion about them that has ensued, in AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND 
THE COMPANY WE KEEP (1995). 
II Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1963), in LENWOOD C. DAVIS, I HAVE 
A DREA~I: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF MARTIN LUTHER KiNG,JR. 261 (1969). 
I~ [d. (emphasis added). 
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point, however, was mundane as well as visionary. He proclaimed that 
hundreds of thousands of marchers had arrived in Washington that 
sweltering day "to cash a check."13 King elaborated: 
When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent 
words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, they were signing a promissory note to which every 
American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all 
men [yes, black men as well as white men] would be guaran-
teed the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness.14 
In fact, King noted that instead of honoring "this sacred obligation," 
the check had been returned to the Negro people marked "in-
sufficient funds.''15 But, he continued, ''we refuse to believe that the 
bank of justice is bankrupt. "16 
King's image of a promissory note is noteworthy. When he sought 
to particularize his compelling Dream, King did so somewhat inaccu-
rately in the language of everyday legalism. Images of "checks" and 
"promissory notes" seemed both simple and serious, without much 
need to reflect on the way the legal terms actually work in the world. 
And King clearly also mythologized the historical promise that he 
invoked. His blend of the Declaration of Independence and the Con-
stitution in support of chil rights, for example, hardly makes specific 
sense historically. 
In the tradition of Frederick Douglass, however, King reinter-
preted the core American stories of origin.!' Douglass, who famously 
declared that he could not celebrate Independence Day while slavery 
continued, began to interpret the Constitution as an antislavery docu-
ment that, properly understood, imposed an ongoing duty on all 
Americans to end slavery and to restore the "plundered rights" of those 
who had been enslaved.18 Like Douglass, King discerned what the 
promise of the founding documents ought to entail. In his soaring 
13 [d. 
14 [d. 
I, [d. 
16 King, supra note 11, at 261. 
17 See Milner S. Ball, StOlies of Oligin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. RE,'. 2280 
(1989). 
IR See WILLIAM S. McFEELY, FREDERICK DOUGLASS 204-07 (1991). In Douglass's famous Fifth 
of July Speech in 1852, which is "perhaps the greatest antislavery oration ever given," Douglass 
insisted that" [t) he 4th of July is the first great fact in your nation's history-the very ring-bolt 
in the chain of your yet undeveloped destiny." [d. at 173. 
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words, "[tJ his note was a promise that all men would be guaranteed 
the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. "19 
This founding promise is ongoing. It has created a kind of constitu-
tional promissory estoppel-a promise enforceable beyond the usual 
formalities of contract law by the very nature of its relational, largely 
open-ended compulsion. The specific intention of the founders-who-
ever one includes in that group-is not determinative. The actions of 
those who subsequently rely on and interpret the promise also count.20 
The reasonable possibilities that the original words helped to create 
become crucial. That many people have relied to their great detriment 
also has significance. Founding promises thus can constitute a differ-
ent kind of social contract, a contract that, over time, becomes a new 
manifestation of America's destiny. 
King also underscored the complexity of any genuine promise of 
freedom-including the fundamental idea that true freedom entails 
being bound to the destiny of others. For example, King praised whites 
who "have come to realize that ... their freedom is inextricably bound 
to our freedom. We cannot walk alone. "21 We are beginning to com-
prehend that victimizers and bystanders may also be victims, at least 
through the shame of the lasting effects of past injustices. 22 This, I 
believe, was a major element of King's elaboration of the promise of 
America and the appeal of his American Dream. It also might help 
explain some of the power of King's oft-quoted invocation of the words 
of the ancient prophet Amos: "[WJ e will not be satisfied until justice 
rolls down like waters and righteousness like a mighty stream. "23 This 
I~I King, supm note 11, at 261. See generally the recent symposium, Dr. ]Martin Luther King's 
Life in Proactive Engagement: The Lalll)'er as Social Activist in the Community, 50 ALA. L. REv. 1 
(1998) and, specifically, Blake D.l\Iorant, The Teachings of Dr: Alartin Luther King,]r: and Contract 
Them]: An Intriguing Compmison, 50 ALA. L. REv. 63 (1998). 
20 For a somewhat similar approach in quite a different context, see Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casl?)', 505 U.S. 833, 847, 901 (1992) (O'Connor,J., plurality opinion 
joined by Kennedy, J. and Souter, J.) ("It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of 
personal liberty which the governmeut may not enter .... Our Constitution is a covenant running 
from the first generation of Americans to us and to future generations."). 
21 King, supra note 11, at 262. 
22Judge Richard J. Goldstone of the South African Constitutional Court, who is also the 
former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals on the fonner Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, makes this point briefly but powerfully in his Foreword to MINOW, supra note 6, at xii. 
Goldstone credits the plapHight Ariel Dorfman for poin ting out to him that white South Africans 
are also victims of apartheid, at least in that their discomfort with truth is their shame, which also 
makes them victims. See id. 
23 King, supra note 11, at 262. The demand that Amos made of the Jewish people, who had 
grown soft and corrupt beneath their assumption that they were the chosen people, is translated 
as: "[Lletjustice ''-1''11 up as waters/ And righteousness as a mighty stream." THE TWELVE PROPHETS 
107 (A. Cohen ee\. & trans., Soncino Press 1948). Frederick Douglass also had invoked powerful 
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combination of threat and promise-and the distinction between jus-
tice and righteousness at which it hints-deserves more attention as it 
pertains both to large issues of group redress and to the individual 
choices in everyday life. 
Powerful recognition of the ongoing responsibility for others-
even when one's own group has been horribly "ictimized-is one of 
the most salient aspects of these articles. By exploring some subtle and 
not-so-subtle costs of reparations, as well as a range of possible benefits, 
Professors Iijima, Westley and Yamamoto have called upon us to raise 
our eyes above the reports of appellate decisions. We can and should 
enlarge our perspective beyond the supposed rugged individualism 
that remains central to most American legal discourse. In so doing, all 
three scholars have done us a great senice, though they have not freed 
us of responsibility. 
C. 1ustice is a mode of action, righteousness a quality of the person. '24 
It is well known that the Supreme Court struggled mightily in the 
1950s to determine what might be constitutionally wrong with segre-
gation in the public schools. What the Justices should say and do about 
the long-standing, pervasive evil of segregation seemed hardly self-evi-
dent. That the Court itself was implicated directly through its legitimi-
zation of the rise of Jim Crow and the stranglehold of racism com-
pounded the problem. The strikingly vague reach and limits of Brown 
v. Board of Education25-and of the desegregation decisions that fol-
lowed-is quite familiar. Less often noticed, however, is the way the 
Court supported its claim that it would be "unthinkable" to have one 
water imagery in his Fifth of July Speech as he warned of the terrible consequences to the United 
States were justice not done: 
There is consolation in the thought that America is young. Great streams are not 
easily turned from channels, worn deep in the course of ages. They may sometimes 
rise in quiet and stately majesty, and inundate the land, refreshing and fertilizing 
the earth with their mysterious properties. They may also rise in wrath and fury, 
and bear away, on their angry waves, the accumulated wealth of years of toil and 
hardship. They, however, gradually flow back to the same old channel, and flow on 
as serenely as ever. But, while the river may not be turned aside, it may dry up, and 
leave nothing behind but the withered branch, and the unsightly rock, to howl in 
abyss-sweeping wind, the sad tale of departed glory. As with rivers so with nations. 
McFEELY, supra note 18, at 173. 
24ABRAHAMJ. HESCHEL, THE PROPHETS 201 (1969). 
25 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court proclaimed implementation "with all deliberate speed" 
the following year, Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955), and, of course, 
Americans have been battling over desegregation and the relath'e color-blindness of the Consti-
tution ever since. 
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rule about equality for the states and another for the federal govern-
ment. When Chief Justice Earl Warren tried to explain why Washing-
ton, D.C. could not maintain racially segregated public schools once 
Brown was decided, he identified "our American ideal of fairness" as 
the source for both equal protection and due process.26 It is instructive, 
albeit hardly surprising, that such an explicit concept offairness-per-
haps partially the product of Warren's personal guilt over his own 
involvement in the internment tragedy-has not played a significant 
role in constitutional law since 1954. 
Dissenting in Romer v. Evans, for example, Justice Scalia excori-
ated the majority for its "heavy reliance upon principles of righteous-
ness rather than judicial holdings. "27 This presumed disjunction be-
tween righteousness and the activity of judges is both commonplace 
and telling. Justice Scalia bitterly remonstrated about the "terminal 
silliness" of the majority's holding that a state may not deny legal 
protection to a group because it is disfavored.28 Actually, however, 
Romer recognized something crucial when the majority proclaimed: "A 
law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group 
of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself 
a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense. "2Y 
Denial of legal protection is itself injustice. This is so even without a 
clear benchmark. In the context of past inequities, moreover, acts of 
active righteousness are particularly necessary even to begin to provide 
redress. Juster justice for all demands nothing less from all of us. 
Id. 
26 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 V.S. 497, 499 (1954). Warren stated for the unanimous Court: 
The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not 
contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which 
applies only to the states. But the concepts of equal protection and due process, 
both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. 
The "equal protection of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited 
unfairness than "due process of law," and, therefore, we do not imply that the two 
are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimina-
tion may be so unjustifiable as to be ,·iolative of due process. 
n 517 V.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia,]., dissenting) (criticizing Court's ill\'alidation of Colorado 
constitutional amendment that prohibited all state and local government protection "based on 
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation"). The first line of Scalia's unbridled cri de coew' is 
the memorable charge: "The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite." Id. Beyond the 
unfortunate connotations of this beginning, the remainder of the dissent is startling for its acerbic 
passion. Obsen·ing that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined Scalia's opinion and 
presumably tempered it somewhat, my student, David McCay, asked, "What did the first draft look 
like?" 
~H /d. at 639. 
2!l /d. at 633. 
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Aristotle defined equity as follows: "This is the essential nature of 
the equitable: it is rectification of law where law is defective because of 
its generality."30 What is at stake in reparations claims, as well as in 
related restorative justice efforts, is significantly different from the 
Aristotelian prescription. The key distinction may be that reparations 
claims usually seem anchored in perceived defects in law when law is 
not general enough. 
Another problem inherent in relying on traditional legal proc-
esses is that the standard insistence on treating like cases alike tends 
to miss entirely the suffering brought about by extraordinary wrong-
doing. This is the case whether the evil is banal, deep-seated or the 
product of either private or public collective violence. Moreover, a legal 
system that simply balances interests may prove too ready to accept any 
justification that seems reasonable-even when a statement of benign 
ends masks horrific means or balances away fundamental human dig-
nity. 
It may be expecting too much of judges and of a regular legal 
system to begin to make amends for drastic wrongs. It may also be 
asking too much of popularly-elected officials in other branches of 
government to attempt to afford justice to those who have suffered 
grievous wrongs in the past. Excessh'e focus on what ends are just tends 
to diminish attention to mundane, everyday needs. And the ability to 
heed nuances and to look beyond the anecdotal is hardly a strength 
of the legislative and executive branches with which we are familiar. It 
is unclear, therefore, to what, if any, institution we should address the 
petitions for redress of past wrongs. 
Ultimately, it may be that the only way to begin to achieve justice 
is to try to act righteously in the particularities of everyday life. This 
helps explain why there is such power in Professor Iijima's riveting 
account of his father's medals, earned in service for the fabled 442nd 
Regimental Combat Team in World War II, and of his father's under-
standing of the need to fight for the rights of others during peacetime. 
Doing the right thing because it is the right thing to do is a common 
motif within the remarkable stories of those who sheltered Jews during 
World War II despite extraordinary personal risk.3) As Martha Minow 
30 AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, EQUITY IN JEWISH LAW BEYOND EQUITY: HALAKHIC AsPIRATION-
ISM IN JEWISH CIVIL LAW xxh' (1991) (quoting Aristotle). 
31 See, e.g., ENRICO DEAGLlO, THE BANALITY OF GOODNESS: THE STORY OF GIORGIO PERLASCA 
(Gregory Conti trans., Notre Dame Press 1998); PHILIP PAUL HALLIE, LEST INNOCENT BLOOD BE 
SHED: THE STORY OF THE VILLAGE OF LE CHAMBON, AND How GoODNESS HAPPENED THERE 
(1979). 
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describes it, "[a]ffinning common humanity does not mean turning 
the other cheek or forgetting what happened."3~ Yet, too much remem-
bering may also be dangerous. The repeated, gruesome violence in the 
fonner Yugoslavia exemplifies how intense, unresolved memories of 
past wrongs can fester and then explode. Nonetheless, affirmation of 
common humanity both in everyday life and in, at the least, symbolic 
public discourse concerning the past may be the necessary precondi-
tions for the genuine redress of grievances, and for making halting 
steps toward progress. 
CONCLUSION 
It remains striking how discussions of redress for past wrongs tend 
to reflect the particular background of the person trying to make a 
specific point or claim. Hardly immune, I thus think in terms of tikkun 
olam ("repair of the world")-a remarkable concept that is much in 
vogue in contemporary Jewish thought. Often, tikkun olam is invoked 
as a kind of traditional shorthand for the ongoing commitment to 
social justice. Yet the commitment to tikkun olam is hardly untroubled. 
One basic question, for example, revolves around how particular or 
universal this Jewish social justice commitment ought to be.33 Another 
issue involves the extent of human agency in getting the world into a 
state of disrepair in the past or in being able to help mend the effects 
of our human ways for the present and future. Of course, such con-
cerns are hardly unique to Jews. Yet, unsurprisingly, I find cogency and 
force in Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel's observations that "[t] he 
opposite of freedom is not determinism, but hardness of heart .... "34 
and that "[t]he demand is not only to respect justice in the sense of 
abstaining from doing injustice, but also to strive for it, to pursue it."35 
A repeated refrain in the Talmud is that: "Man must act beyond 
the rule of law. "36 Indeed, it is often acknowledged that one may be a 
scoundrel-or even worse-while remaining within the boundaries of 
the Torah, of the law. For individuals, as for groups and for govern-
ments, an inescapable challenge within a world full of wrongdoing is 
how to affirm common humanity alongside the demands of the law. It 
32 :\hNOW, supra note 6, at 146. 
33 See generally TIKKuN OLAM: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN JEWISH THOUGHT AND LAW (David 
Shatz et al. eds., 1997). 
:H HESCHEL, supra note 24, at 191. 
35 Id. at 207. 
% KIRSHENBAUM, supra note 30; MOSHE SILBERG, TALMUDIC LAW AND THE MODERN STATE 
61-130 (Marvin S. Wiener ed. & Ben Zion Bokser trans., Burning Bush Press 1973); Saul Berman, 
Law and A/orality, in THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 153 (Menachem Elon ed., 1975). 
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may be that righteousness can only be reached through law's justice. 
Yet, paradoxically, it may also be the case that justice can never be 
accomplished without the pursuit of righteousness, actively sought and 
lived within the quotidian jurisdictions of the soul. 
Martha Minow wisely articulates the essence of the daunting task 
that these three articles eloquently assign to us all. The challenge, she 
says, is to discover "the path of recollection and affirmation and the 
path of facing who we are, and what we would become."3i Or, as Martin 
Luther King,]r. put the point, "[iJ n the process of gaining our rightful 
place we must not be guilty of wrongful deeds."38 In fact, there may be 
no righteous ends-only righteous means. Even without clear bench-
marks, substantial redress still has its claims. We must attend to that 
principle if we ever hope to make progress toward the remarkable old 
promise of reciprocal freedom. 
37 MINOW, supra note 6, at 147. 
38 King, supra note II, at 262. 

